Here onwards from part 5, we will talk about the developments in the Eastern Sector, the Indo-Tibetan border along the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA); which is now called Arunachal Pradesh. (read previous posts for greater understanding)
NEFA had a good defense line and a bit smoother planning than Ladakh; however it too suffered major setbacks due to negligent behaviour of the General Staff.
Just like Ladakh, the advent of our military presence in NEFA was due to the Chinese overrunning our post at Longju (see part-1). However, on the other hand, NEFA had been gradually opened up by the NEFA Administration assisted by Assam Rifles. There was, thereforem a semplance of authority and control in most areas of NEFA. Militarily, however, it was still a closed book; and thus the immediate requirement was for the induction of some force to act as a firm base for further buildup.
A meeting was held in Shillong on 13 September 1959 which included the COAS himself, the GOC-in-C** Eastern Command and IG Assam Rifles, and a decision was taken that (unlike Ladakh), no new posts were to be established along the Indo-Tibet border (referred to as McMahon Line), and the posts were only meant to be a symbol of authority, and would help in observing and informing about the Chinese activities at the front. In case of an attack, however, they were not expected to fight; instead would retreat to firm bases to organise counterattack.
In order to check the efficiency of the orders and regarding the strength required to deal with the Chinese, the Indian Army, in April 1960 conducted an exercise in Lucknow, which put forth the requirement of at least one division with four infantry brigades. However, this requirement for unknown reasons, was put aside by the Army headquarters, and instead of 4 they had 3 brigades, the reason stated that an additional brigade could be utilised from Nagaland in case of outbreak of hostilities. To utter surprise, instead of getting the fourth brigade out from Nagaland, one more additional brigade was diverted from the division and sent to there, practically bringing down its numbers to only 2 brigades in NEFA.
Even after intelligence review was released by the Army HQ in 1960 about the much greater concentration of Chinese forces and its buildup along the border compared to an year ago in 1959, the general operative plans should have been reconsidered and a reappraisal should have been sought by the Headquarters, but, even after repeated messages for reaffirmation of the Operation Instructions from the Eastern Command; the HQ did not give a heed to new operational plans based on the new intel reports of the greater Chinese strength, approx triple to that of the previous year. The reason given to this is that in the meantime, the General Staff had been changed at the HQ and was not informed of the exact on-field intelligence reviews. However, this reason holds little ground.
To sum it up in understandable words, the Indian Army in 1960 was still working on the plans laid out to defend against the Chinese an year ago (1959). Even after new intelligence did appear that Chinese have increased their numbers 300% in 1960, Indian Army just closed their eyes and worked on the plans laid down in 1959.
However, saying that they completely ignored the intelligence can be wrong as they laid down new policy, BUT, it still did not consider the new numbers. The Chinese threat was expected to be of a division strength in 1959, but new intelligence stated it to be three divisions in 1960. But our plans, even after being based on the same intelligence, did not subscribe to the increase in numbers and continued to be prepared for a single-division attack. Furthermore, the plans laid down were not properly adhered to in the war-- this weakened our established defense line.
This, coupled with the earlier stated about the effective division strength of just two brigades, was the foundation stone for the ineffectiveness of the further military planning.
"It was, therefore, all the more necessary in 1961 to have acted with caution and avoided any provocative action. Instead, the "Forward Policy" was introduced. LADAKH may have been the main venue for its implementation, but an appreciation of its effect would have shown the resultant reaction in NEFA."
Then, as we know, the "Forward Policy" was introduced in late 1961. Here too, we will see the same pattern of events; orders of moving further towards the borders, no mention of the "Third" point (see part 3) and no induction of additional troops as requested by the Eastern Command.
This was an introduction and pre-requisite for what we are going to study further under the Eastern Command. The separate situations in both Western Command (LADAKH) has been brought out in the previous posts.
**GOC-in-C refers to "General Officer Commanding-in-Chief".
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