In this part, we will discuss about what went wrong (further) while implementing the Forward policy, continuing forward with the series. Disclaimer: If you haven't been through the previous three posts, you might have a hard time realising what's being mentioned here.
As the Army Headquarters directives to the Commands did not mention the third operation directive (read part 3), the Western Command did not express its inability to implement the forward policy.
Accordingly, several new posts were established along the defence line, from Daulat Beg Oldi to Demchok, and further pushing against the Chinese and trying to maintain dominance. But, things were not totally in the hands of our troops.
For example, according to the orders from the Army headquarters, several new reconnaissance and supplementary posts were established in Daulat Beg Oldi, but the Chinese surrounded them and our troops had to withdraw, and later Chinese established 3 posts in the area. Similarly, the Western Command, in view of the possible Chinese reactions recommended that NO post should be established near SAMZUNGLING, but the Army HQ overruled their recommendations and the post was established in July 1962 and was consolidated to a platoon strength, however it was later surrounded by more than 70 Chinese soldiers who gradually increased to a battalion. Even after the requests by the Command not to use land route for logistics, Army HQ still overruled it and our land columns were subsequently intercepted and prevented to reach the post by the Chinese.
"21. By the end of July, 1962, we had, in the NORTH, moved forward fairly deep, and, in the central sector around CHUSHUL, gone upto the vicinity of the Chinese posts. In the SOUTH, we had established posts at REZANGLA, CHANGLA, and around DEMCHOK upto the International Border.
22. These new posts, some 36 in number, obviously further dispersed our (already) meagre resources and depleted our strength in the vital bases. Thus, whereas we needed added strength at our bases to back up the new posts, we now had weakness."
Undeniably, the Chinese were observing our actions and evidently their reaction was en route, having much greater resources and easier communications. However, our Army Headquarters failed to show such visionary approach and neglected the intelligence they had on the possible Chinese reactions (see part 3).
There are 4 major incidents mentioned in the report of July 1962 in which an armed clash happened with the Chinese, who even used Mortars and LMGs to fire upon our patrols. An additional battalion of Jat Regiment (5 JAT) was inducted in Ladakh.
However, the report also mentions that this negligible increase of troops as compared to that of the Chinese meant little or no difference. With the probe forward the total posts that had come into existence were in the region of 60. A few of these were perhaps upto platoon strength. Remainder were perforce section and below.
In easier words, imagine posts with just about 10 personnel (a section) stranded very thinly across barren landscape of Ladakh Range with very less logistical support, against well equipped enemy which used to surround them in more than double their number along with heavier firepower. And, as Western Command repeatedly kept requesting for further support, their efforts went in vain and practically they were denied of the support.
In point 38, page-17, it is mentioned that "This is borne out by the remark of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (Officiating Chief of the General Staff) to Lt. Gen. L.P. SEN, DSO in September 1962 that "experience in LADAKH had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away". Tensions also increased in NEFA and our DHOLA post was also surrounded by the Chinese.
As it was, we acted on a militarily unsound basis of not relying on our own strength but rather on believed lack of reaction from the Chinese. We forgot the age old dictum of the "Art of War" summed up aptly by Field Marshal Lord Roberts- "The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of enemy NOT coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable."
The fact remains that orders were given by the General Staff in December 1961 for the implementation of the "Forward Policy" without the prerequisite of "major bases" for restoring a military situation, as laid down by the Government. Indeed General KAUL as CGS and the DMO, time and again, ordered in furtherance of the "Forward Policy" the establishment of individual posts, overruling protests made by Western Command.
The mistakes made by the CGS (Chief of General Staff), his Deputy, the DMO, DMI, and other Staff Directors is said to be "inexcusable" in the report and further strengthened the point that from this stemmed the unpreparedness and unbalance of our forces. The report also mentioned, "Comparatively the mistakes and lapses of the staff sitting in DELHI without the stress and strain of battle are more henious than the errors made by commanders in the field of battle".
Because of the unacceptable mistakes made at the highest command level, it was a junior leaders and jawans battle and there is no doubt that they acquitted themselves well. They fought under grave handicaps and in face of defeat; yet there was no sign of undue panic and never a rout. The main reason for this was that troops fought under commanders they knew well and trusted. There was no interference or short-circuiting in the chain of command and commanders on the sport were given freedom of action. The good name of our Army was NOT completely marred in Ladakh and the grave errors committed by the General Staff to an extent mitigated; thanks to the fighting ability of our troops. We must, however, ensure that never again should our troops placed in such jeopardy. (point 16, page 33).
We will now move on to the happenings in the Eastern Theatre (NEFA, aka Arunachal Pradesh) in subsequent parts. Stay tuned.
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