Here in Part 3, let's move on to greater depths and analyse the situation after the induction of the Battalion 1/8 GR in the 114 Infantry Brigade and the Forward Policy. In case you are reading this without having read the previous two parts, I strongly recommend to halt immediately and check them out first.
So, our total strength in Ladakh by October 1961 was only a Brigade which had three battalions:
1/8 Gorkha Rifles
7 J&K Militia
14 J&K Militia
Which is approximate, 2500 troops holding a vast line of approximately 300 kilometers without much logistical support against more than double the strength of the enemy, who had better laid down communications and road networks in the area compared to the situations an year ago.
"It will be seen that, by October, 1961, the situation had further been weighted in favour of the Chinese. We had only managed to complete the induction of one infantry battalion, and thus there were, at that time, one brigade (114 Infantry Brigade) of one regular infantry battalion and two J&K Militia battalions in LADAKH.
This brigade had NO supporting arms in the shape of artillery, mortars, or MMGs. The road had barely been completed to LEH from SRINAGAR. The land routes to all posts EAST of LEH were, at best, difficult mule tracks over the high LADAKH Range"- point 16, Brooks-Bhagat report.
While this was our situation, the Chinese had opened up vehicular routes upto their western-most posts and also strengthened them.
However, at this juncture, the "FORWARD POLICY" was brought into force (late 1961).
THE FORWARD POLICY
A meeting was held at the Prime Minister's Office on 2nd November 1961 attended by the PM Nehru, Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon, Foreign Secretary M.J.Desai, COAS Gen Thapar, Director of IB B.N. Mullik, with discussions about the strategic situations at Indo-Tibetan Border. It is to be noted that DIB was of the opinion that "the Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were NOT LIKELY TO USE FORCE AGAINST ANY OF OUR POSTS EVEN IF THEY WERE IN A POSITION TO DO SO."
This was contrary to the Military Intelligence reports, which had stated otherwise as brought out in the conclusion of Army HQ Annual Intelligence Review 1959-1960 which clearly indicated that the Chinese would resist by force any attempts to take back territory held by them. On what basis was the decision made in the PMO regarding the Chinese offensive capabilities is not known.
Thus, a "Forward Policy" was decided in the meeting with decisions of significant importance and is still the main reason China holds the opinion that India started the war. Some of the important decisions made in the policy were:
So far as Ladakh is concerned, we are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the International Border. This will be done with a view to establishing our posts which should prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also dominating from our territory. This must be done without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese, unless this becomes necessary in self defense.
As regards UP and other northern areas, there are not the same difficulties as LADAKH. We should, therefore, as far as practicable, go forward and be in effective occupation of the whole frontier. Where there be any gaps, they must be covered either by patrolling of by posts.
In view of numerous operational and administrative difficulties, efforts should be made to position major concentration of forces along our borders in places (bases) conveniently situated behind the forward posts from where they could be maintained logistically and from where they can restore a border situation at short notice.
These decisions made under the Forward Policy have no theoretical problems, and is a major step to have an upper hand at the Indo-Tibetan border and seemed fair to counter the buildup of Chinese forces and their eviction from our land. It was a politically and theoretically sound but the real question is if we were in a militarily sound position, for which the answer remained negative. The buildup of forces on one side of the border is seen as an aggressive action by the other and starts hostilities; and the situation hangs on a weak thread of who loses patience and pulls the trigger first. But, this time the government bureaucrats held a general opinion that the Chinese were in no position to attack the consolidation of our forces, and did not consider the Military Intelligence reports and the practical situation of logistics on ground.
The implementation of the Forward Policy considering our meagre strength of troop numbers in Ladakh was utopian. Implementation of the 3rd point is, obviously, a pre-requisite for any maintenance of posts and logistics and requires sizeable number of troops along with supporting arms. But, the ground situation was the actual strength of just three battalions holding a 300 kilometre line with several posts manned by just one platoon (25-30 personnel) or less, and the request for a division strength was neglected (see part 2). With the meagre force then in Ladakh, there was no question of there being major bases even to withstand any attack, let alone restore a situation.
But the Army HQ still pressed on to implement the Forward Policy (under its policy laid down to the Commands) without giving a heed to the third point mentioned.
"There was NO question of Army Headquarters NOT knowing that such bases (mentioned in point 3 above) did NOT exist at that time. Thus on the face of it, there appeared to be a situation which is hard to reconcile. The Government who politically must have been keen to recover territory, advocated a cautious policy; whilst Army HQ dictated a policy that was clearly militarily unsound."
We will discuss further into the implementation of the Forward Policy in Part-4. Stay tuned.
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