UNDERSTANDING THE 1962 SINO-INDIAN WAR: THE BROOKS-BHAGAT REPORT (Part-2)

As you now know the basic pre-requisite knowledge from the Part one, here we move on to the CHAPTER-2, which describes the situations in LADAKH. If you haven't gone through the Part-1 of the series, I strongly recommend going back and give it a read: https://truthaddict.wixsite.com/news/post/understanding-the-1962-sino-indian-war-the-brooks-bhagat-report-part-1

So, it all started when the Chinese overran our posts at LONGJU in NEFA (fig. 1) on 25 August 1959 and ambushed our patrol in Kongka La just east of our post at HOT SPRING in Ladakh (fig.2) in October of the same year. Here too they claimed that these posts were in their territory, though these were even 40-50 miles inside our territory.

So, this was like an alarm that the Chinese have now started aggressive military showdown in Tibet and that they will try to take their interests in Indian territory by force. Before these incidents, the borders used to be maintained by Police and Paramilitary forces, not the Army. So, in wake of these, Indian Army was now moved in and given control of the Indo-Tibet border- which had been dormant (peaceful) till these recent events.

After an early analysis of the Chinese threat, it was said that Chinese would only limit to small scuffles, of company and battalion level and would hesitate to launch a larger offensive during this period, and the Indian Army built up presence in the area with a Brigade plus two battalions and was asked to ensure no "FURTHER" ingress was made by the Chinese. (we're talking about early days, 1959-1960). A series of posts was set up by the two battalions (7 and 14 J&K Militia**) along an approximately 300 kilometre defense line. The remainder of the Brigade group could not be inducted into Ladakh owing to shortage of air lift. So, in essence we had only a Brigade HQ and two battalions worth of troops.

Okay, here we revise up a bit.

During 1960s Indian Army built up substantial presence in Ladakh after it was called in in 1959 to check the Chinese. A Brigade was established and given task to hold on to a general line, spanning approximately 300 kilometres from Murgo to Demchok (see figure) to not allow any "FURTHER" Chinese ingress {there is a specific emphasis on the word further' in the report, as this hints that Indian army was not to launch any offensive action, and only be in a defensive posture}. Also, they were to patrol the areas nearby regularly to make their presence felt and dominate the area.

The General defence line from Murgo to Demchok passing through Tsogstsalu, Phobrang and Chushul.

A better representation (marked by the red line):

Nevertheless, by the end of 1960, it was clear that Chinese too have started consolidating their positions and are increasing their strength day by day and after doing some exercises, Indian Army's Western Command realised that they would require a of a Division's strength instead of a Brigade to successfully counter the Chinese buildup and any offensive action. After all the required planning, they (Western Command) sent a recommendation to the Army Headquarters in September 1961 that they urgently required to increase their strength to one division to counter the Chinese, but NO DECISION WAS TAKEN BY THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

In easier words, by that time we only had one Brigade in LADAKH, whereas we required about three to four times that strength, and the Army HQ ignored this and did not respond even after recommendation made by the Western Command.

We cannot think that the Army HQ did not know about the gravity of Chinese presence. In October 1960 they released an Intelligence Review which estimated a major threat to Ladakh with a large Chinese force of over one Division and possible armour support. Also in the report they mentioned the improved Chinese abilities to mobilise troops and better communications. So, they (Army HQ) knew about it, but still neglected or didn't work upon the Western Command's request.

"As against the Chinese build up of some three times to what it was in 1959, ours was negligible due to shortage of logistic support. The road to LADAKH from SRINAGAR which had started in 1959/1960 got a fresh impetus in 1960, when the Border Roads Organisation took over road construction, and, by October 1961, the road to LEH was completed. Our forward bases, such as CHUSHUL, however, still continued to be air-maintained."- point 12, page 6: Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report.

Only one infantry battalion (1/8 GR) as against a brigade group was with difficulty inducted into Ladakh during 1961, and the defence line was extended to Daulat Beg Oldi in the north. So, by 1961 the defence line looked like this:

Here we covered the overall military buildup and ignorance of Army HQ to induct more troops into Ladakh. Stay tuned for the Part 3.

**: J&K Militia was constituted to a full-fledged regiment 'Jammu & Kashmir Militia" in 1972 and re-named to 'Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry' in 1976.

If you're new to the series, start with the first part: https://truthaddict.wixsite.com/news/post/understanding-the-1962-sino-indian-war-the-brooks-bhagat-report-part-1